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Critical framings
This book is a reflection on the politics of heritage in Europe at the present time, 
in a moment of pluralised conceptions of the political, social and demographic 
organisation proper to Europe. It is not a book that seeks to survey, define or 
characterise an enduring ‘European heritage’ as an entity, but rather to explore 
what heritage does – how it is understood, instrumentalised and what it enables 
– within what we will argue is a ‘critical’ moment for both identities and geopol-
itics in Europe.
 All of the research that we present in this volume was articulated in relation 
to a project – entitled Critical Heritages of Europe, or ‘CoHERE’ – that received 
European Union (EU) Horizon 2020 research and innovation funding between 
2016 and 2019.1 CoHERE examined how identities in Europe are articulated in 
representations and performances of the past – whether at the level of policy, in 
heritage festivals and sites, school curricula, museums and memory practices or 
in party politics. The project involved multiple institutions (including museums) 
across Europe and Turkey. It represented one of the most pluridisciplinary plat-
forms to date for understanding the past in the European present in all of its 
forms and complexity. The project viewed heritage in Europe as malleable matter 
through which actors make different realities and imprint different desires, 
whether for a pan- European sense of community and belonging, or a nostalgic 
return to simpler times as a defence against change and threat. This book is just 
one result of that project, although it is a keystone for the larger edifice. It is a 
team effort, hence its somewhat hybrid character as something between a mono-
graph and an edited collection. It is also a hybrid in other ways: part multidisci-
plinary cultural study, part collective travelogue, this book combines heritage 
scholarship of different kinds – critical, poetic, analytical, creative, political and 
even cinematographic – to do some wayfinding in European place, time and 
society. Although different contributors have had different levels and types of 
involvement, all share a critical orientation towards the cultural significance of 
the past for contemporary geo- and identity politics in and of Europe.
 Our project responded to a key policy concern of the 2010s, which located 
‘cultural heritage and values…at the heart of our capability of overcoming the 
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current EU crisis’. In a moment of popular disaffection, an EU policy drive 
sought to provide ‘a solid basis for the emergence of a truly European cultural 
heritage’ as a positive counter to the negative effects of crisis, a means of collec-
tivisation based on shared histories. This was a way of fostering a supranational 
demos constituted not through effective political representation (in fact, voter 
turnout at European elections has been both low and in decline since 19792), but 
through its own self- identification as a cultural and historical community, a 
process sometimes termed ‘reflexive Europeanisation’. Heritage, in this view, is 
understood to play ‘a key role in providing a sense of European belonging and 
EU citizenship as distinct from, but combined with, national citizenship’.3
 One of the reasons for this book, and the research project that produced it, is 
that a conglomeration of crises has come into view over the last decade or so, the 
combined effect of which is an increasingly bitter contest over identities, ways 
of life and us/them relations. Within this crisis formation are, interconnectedly: 
disaffection resulting from the 2008 financial crash, from de- industrialisation 
and austerity; the frequently- remarked rise of nationalisms, including the open 
return of Fascist or quasi- Fascist ideologies; the stresses – practical and moral – 
of coping with mass refugeeism, particularly from Africa and the Middle East; 
the ‘failure’ of multiculturalism remarked by important political figures such as 
Angela Merkel and David Cameron; the threat of a fragmentation of the EU 
(constituting, in the eyes of some, the first signs of its wholesale disaggregation); 
and a loss of faith in the union as a political and social project. A ‘critical’ 
moment can be one in which the turning point is in view: things can succeed or 
fail from now on; the patient (in a ‘critical condition’) can live or die; it is a per-
ceived degeneration from stability. Crisis is also a condition in which social 
actors look around themselves and are sometimes upset and critical (Eder, 2014, 
p. 221), seeking to ‘make sense of things’, and sometimes desiring change or 
seeking to revert in some way to previous situations and orders. What does heri-
tage do, and what are its dimensions, in such a moment?
 To be clear, we take this configuration of crises as a set of interlinked struc-
tural and discursive phenomena. Crisis, as Reinhardt Koselleck (2006) indicated, 
is a Schlagwort, a catchword. It has the capacity to accommodate and express 
multiple senses that things have gone wrong. It has its temporal logic, meaning 
that there was a time before crisis, there was a sliding- into crisis and there is an 
envisaged aftermath too. It says, ‘we are in the thick of a difficult time’. But so 
many facets of experience, as well as many different phenomena, can be con-
tained in the word that its actual meaning can be ambiguous, in a way that makes 
for a generalised sense of malaise rather than detailed understandings of com-
plexity. The temporal order of what led to what, and what is a cause and what a 
symptom, often traduces the intersecting, dynamic, relational and intertextual 
nature of problems. What is the crisis and wherein? Journalist Natalie Nou-
gayrède (2016) shows how this can be flipped in her correction: ‘Europe isn’t 
confronted with a refugee and migrant crisis. It’s the refugees and migrants who 
are confronted with a crisis of Europe.’4 This is not just wordplay. Such discur-
sive disagreements about explanations, causalities, causes and instigators of 
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crisis – as in the frequent debates over where to lay the blame: immigration or 
austerity; EU policy or bankers’ greed? – turn into significant social cleavages 
with very real consequences, for example through referenda.
 The word crisis effects itself, and there is sometimes no clear bar between 
signifier and signified. It may refer to structural conditions of disadvantage and 
would likely have little purchase without such reference, but it is also capable of 
grossly simplifying causes and conditions and amplifying affects. An increased 
sense of crisis, a general prevalence of the concept of crisis as an explanation for 
contemporary ills has the potential, in turn, to foster actions that effectively 
exacerbate those ills. This is comparable to what Thomas Hylland Eriksen calls 
an ‘overheating’ of crises, which are themselves produced through the accelera-
tion of globalisation and the ensuing clashes between global and local scales, 
between the ‘system- world’ and the lifeworld.
[the] globally interconnected world may be described through its tendency 
to generate chronic crises, being complex in such a way as to be ungoverna-
ble, volatile and replete with unintended consequences – there are double 
binds, there is an uneven pace of change, and an unstable relationship 
between universalising and localising processes.
(Eriksen, 2016, p. 7)
It is here, within the tense grounds of negotiating crisis at semantic, practical and 
political levels, that heritage takes on additional roles in the European present as 
both cause and cure, as this book will explore.
 As mentioned, a core preoccupation of European- level5 instrumental uses of 
heritage has been to provide a positive identity narrative rooted in a rich and 
varied, and yet shared, European past. This has been part of a shift in under-
standing at policy levels that heritage can be an important driver of economic 
prosperity relating to cultural tourism, urban or rural regeneration and connec-
tions to the creative industry. Moreover, the idea of a shared heritage has been 
mobilised to counteract disaffection with the social and political project of the 
EU and to provide people with a sense of collectivity and belonging. ‘Cultural 
heritage is now widely appreciated as an essential part of Europe’s underlying 
socio- economic, cultural and natural capital,’ as proposed in a recent EU report 
entitled Getting Cultural Heritage to Work for Europe (EU Directorate- General 
for Research and Innovation, 2015, p. 5). In this view, heritage promises to offer 
a way out of crisis.
 However, while key EU heritage representations (e.g. the Parlamentarium 
and the House of European History opened in Brussels in 2011 and 2017, 
respectively) may present coherent images of a historically- founded, shared 
European identity, the actual social purchase of this can be weak, since diverse 
actors understand both ‘crisis’ and ‘heritage’ differently, and sometimes in ways 
not framed by a sense of European collectivity but by reference to national, 
ethnic or other communities instead. That is, they have different conceptions of 
what the crisis is, where it comes from, who is to blame and what can cure it. 
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There are multiple historical backstories at play, and heritage claims are fre-
quently at work in proposing alternative ways out of crisis, whether as reflexive 
Europeanisation or a reversion to a mythic national past when life was suppos-
edly harder but better. At the ‘cognitive scale’ of day- to-day lives – ‘the size of 
your perceived world’ (Eriksen, 2016, p. 29) – people are unequally able to 
accommodate change, and a process of alienation from large- scale, authoritative 
systems of identity- making compels some to seek alternative orders as an anti-
dote to the present. Certain pasts become reservoirs of symbols whose ‘neces-
sary ambiguity’ (Guibernau, 2013, p. 97) permits people to make meanings and 
mobilise them creatively and sometimes tactically. Consider, for example, the 
frequent reliance of ‘Leave’ activists in the UK Brexit referendum campaign on 
the medieval Magna Carta charter of rights to defend British ‘sovereignty’ 
against the perceived domineering and controlling designs of the EU.6 The alter-
nate heritages and the frictions between them as they move within, and config-
ure, social and political realities, are both effects and causes of crisis. 
Investigating these dissonances is part of this book.
 Over the course of this introductory chapter, we examine the notion and 
effects of the idea of European heritage; we set out some of the key frameworks 
that the book as a whole will adopt; we consider the significance of heritage in 
times of crisis, and we introduce the different chapters. What does heritage do, 
in a situation of crisis, for identities, for geopolitics, for reflexivity, for good? 
We will return to these themes and assumptions repeatedly, and to the instru-
mentalist agendas that sit below them. To begin to pick away at them, let us con-
trast two invocations of European heritage that fell within the timescale of our 
research:
The aim of the European Year of Cultural Heritage is to encourage more 
people to discover and engage with Europe’s cultural heritage, and to 
reinforce a sense of belonging to a common European space… Cultural 
heritage shapes our identities and everyday lives. It surrounds us in Europe’s 
towns and cities, natural landscapes and archaeological sites. It is not only 
found in literature, art and objects, but also in the crafts we learn from our 
ancestors, the stories we tell to our children, the food we enjoy in company 
and the films we watch and recognise ourselves in… You may think of heri-
tage as being ‘from the past’ or static, but it actually evolves though our 
engagement with it. What is more, our heritage has a big role to play in 
building the future of Europe.7
(European Union, 2018)
Everyone can see that Europe is reeling from an unprecedented wave of 
mass migration. The policy [of accommodating non- European refugees in 
EU member states] which Brussels is now pursuing will lead to civilisa-
tional disaster. The nature of civilisational disaster is that it does not happen 
overnight. Instead it proceeds slowly, but inexorably, as differences in fertil-
ity rates and repeated flows of mass migration change the composition and 
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culture of the European population. One tends to take one’s eyes off the 
historical and civilisational horizon, as there are enough problems in the 
here and now, in our everyday lives. Everyday life will continuously adjust, 
conform, and accept. This is in its nature. And in the end one will be unable 
to recognise one’s own world… We may lose our European values, our very 
identity, by degrees like the live frog allowing itself to be slowly cooked to 
death in a pan of water.8
(Viktor Orbán, 2016)
We hope the reader will agree that there is quite a different feel to these two 
statements, although both of them refer, in one way or another, to the idea of a 
shared European heritage. In other ways the quotations represent quite different 
agendas, and they were produced in different contexts. One is a top- down 
European- level9 initiative to encourage participation in the 2018 ‘European Year 
of Cultural Heritage’ (EYCH), either as audiences or as organisations which, by 
staging congruent events, could obtain use of the EYCH visual identity and a 
calendar listing on the official website. The other is the wording of the Hungar-
ian premier, Viktor Orbán, speaking in the Hungarian Parliament during the 
height of what has become known as the ‘Refugee Crisis’. Both excerpts make 
use of the possessive pronoun ‘our’, but in radically different appeals. Orbán is 
exhorting his national electorate to vote ‘no’ in his country’s 2 October 2016 ref-
erendum, to the question: ‘Do you want the European Union to be entitled to 
prescribe the mandatory settlement of non- Hungarian citizens in Hungary 
without the consent of parliament?’ Although their moods are different, both are 
exhortations to feel attachment, to identify, and to collectivise, in relation to the 
referent of a ‘European’ past.
 In the EYCH statement, heritage is seen as a legacy to be both shared and 
transfigured, something that binds together all those who find themselves in 
‘European space’ (a somewhat vague term, to which we will return), regardless 
of difference, in a politics of civility and mutual recognition of one another’s 
rightful belonging. Here, European heritage is an implicitly positive quantity, 
aligning with a policy position that ‘European heritage’ could be called on to 
create a ‘more positive narrative for people’ suffering from the consequences of 
a number of intersecting exonomic, social and political crises (Krasnai, 2017).
 In Orbán’s rhetoric, ‘heritage’ is not referred to directly, although he is keenly 
interested in it.10 But it is implied in the ideas of ‘European values’ and singular 
‘identity’ that have somehow built up over time, that are – theoretically – a 
legacy of a way of life, a mindset, a common frame of experience: as he puts it, 
‘one’s own world’, which has its ‘historical and civilizational horizon’. In this 
world- view, these horizons, values and this identity are under threat from others 
– especially, as a reading of the full speech will disclose – Muslims. It follows 
that not everyone can or should be allowed to have a ‘European’ identity, and 
this is made yet more explicit later on. For Orbán, the historical identity that the 
Hungarian electorate shares is what militates against the admission of difference, 
against the possibility that others might belong.
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 We present these two statements as a kind of split- screen of contrasting 
images of Europe through more or less implicit references to its past and future. 
They model particular affective ‘scripts’ that actors – whether organisations or 
members of an electorate – are encouraged to follow in framing identities: celeb-
ration, inclusivity and intercultural recognition in EYCH, versus othering, 
resentment and the need to defend ‘one’s own world’ in Orbán’s speech. Such 
scripts mobilise ideas of heritage to encourage the cultivation of a particular 
‘self- in-history’. This term refers to how we understand ourselves as members of 
a historical trajectory running up to the present and into the future: how we posi-
tion ourselves in chronologies and narratives; what historical symbols we use to 
orient our moral compasses; with whom we group ourselves, over variable spans 
of historical time, such that we might claim ethnic, cultural, moral or spiritual 
descendance from populations and cultural groups who lived decades, centuries 
or millenia ago. A self- in-history is our sense of how history has made us who 
we are, or who we should be.
 We would argue that the ‘Europes’ in the EYCH and in Orbán’s speech, and 
in the scripts that they suggest, are produced in entirely different dimensions – a 
key term to which we return below – where different techniques, strategies and 
tactics are possible. The EYCH offered an organisational frame for disparate 
activities, but it regulated the content of that activity through qualifying criteria. 
It allocated status, helped organisations to generate publicity and bestowed cul-
tural capital and authority upon them. Orbán, on the other hand, used the tech-
niques and tactics available to him in the different dimension of state and party 
politics: subtly inflecting the terms of the referendum question to influence peo-
ple’s emotional responses; making a publicised speech in parliament, replete 
with rhetorical devices such as the boiling frog, to appeal to audiences and 
frighten them; giving exclusive interviews to pro- government media, scheduled 
to heighten the speech’s impact; and so on. We can debate the real- life con-
sequences of the EYCH’s call for identity building across ‘European space’ or of 
Orbán’s speech for Hungarian state policy (in fact, although an overwhelming 
majority of voters did follow Orbán’s bidding, the referendum was invalidated 
due to insufficient turnout). But none of this is just imagination, or just dis-
course. Somehow, through some effects, different ‘Europes’ are called into being 
through these kind of ‘dimensional’ acts. And these Europes are not the same. In 
fact, their co- existence is a tense one.
Is there a European heritage?
This game – of contrasting two different expressions of what is supposed to be 
one thing – leads us to an unavoidable existential question: is there a European 
heritage?
 This is an existential question as much as it is a political one, because heri-
tage is so frequently the grounds for claims relating to an ontological reality in 
the present. The ontological claim is to say that ‘Europe’ is something more and 
other than mere discourse, semantics, politics, contingency and convenience. If 
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we take Europe to exist as something real, and not just as a chimerical idea, then 
it must have a past that we recognise as having structured the shape of the 
present; a past that has made this something expressly, unequivocally and exclu-
sively ‘European’.
 Attempts to identify, classify and catalogue what Europe is – less in terms of 
geography (which is hard enough) and more in terms of the pasts that matter, 
cultural distinctiveness and the values that people derive from them – have been 
features of recent scholarly literature (e.g. Pomian, 2009; Leggewie, 2010; Mac-
donald, 2013; Delanty, 2018) as well as political and policy discourse such as 
the Council of Europe’s Conclusions on Cultural Heritage as a Strategic 
Resource for a Sustainable Europe (2014)11 and the aforementioned Getting Cul-
tural Heritage to Work for Europe report (EU Directorate- General for Research 
and Innovation, 2015). As we will see, such attempts are more or less nuanced 
and more or less strident. Therein, a core problem is the inevitable tension 
between claims for distinctiveness and the need to be inclusive and alleviate 
differences. This tension is evident in both of our contrasting quotations above, 
as well as in the Council of Europe and European Union refrain of ‘Unity in 
Diversity’. A further problem is what is taken for granted – what features, stories 
and characteristics are understood as givens – in the rhetorical conviction that 
Europe exists as a long- standing and unique cultural formation.
 Against such a conviction is the possibility of existential negation of a kind 
associated with ‘strong’ or ‘hard’ social constructionism, proponents of which 
might suggest that ‘Europe’ has no particular ontology and is nothing more than 
Figure 1.1  A map of the Viking world at the Viking Ship Museum in Oslo, opening a 
window onto historic global formations and crossings overlaid onto the famil-
iar cartography of today.
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a mass of changeable ideas circulating across changeable lands and seas. This is 
far from our view. Of course, when we switch to a millennial timescale, we face 
the fact that there was a time when there was no ‘Europe’, and that there will be 
again; or that its physical shape as a landmass has changed markedly. In that 
sense, Europe is a historical ‘construction’. But to stick to the present, we can 
speculate as to whether a fear of the void of meaning is one of the drivers of an 
ontological- historical project that calls upon heritage to claim that Europe is, 
‘merely’ because Europe was and has been.
 It is relatively common and accepted to debunk essentialising views of 
Europe (see, for example, Guibernau, 2007, pp. 89–98), although this is not uni-
versal practice. But to conceive of a Europe devoid of particular particularity – 
devoid, in a sense, of a self – may be more upsetting, much as it can be to 
contemplate the inexistence of the human soul. Heritage – understood as the idea 
of a past, howsoever manifest, narrated and embodied, that matters in the present 
– can be seen and called upon as a precondition of genuine existence and a guar-
antee of political legitimacy. To be able to document ‘having a culture’, to recall 
an earlier expression from Richard Handler (1985), has become crucial in many 
contexts today. That is why heritage has such core political salience. The issue 
can be expressed as circular logic. For there to be a European heritage, there 
must be such a thing as Europe. For Europe to be, it must ‘have’ a heritage.
 At the time of writing, the formation, coherence and legitimacy of a European 
polity are subject to exceptional critique and strain, and the political stakes are 
immense. This explains how critical a general confidence in the existence of a 
‘European heritage’ is, and how important it is for actors across all sorts of societal 
settings to control, and to invest or disinvest in, its meanings. Europe exists as a 
geopolitical formation upon its identification as such, which requires historical 
imaginations of its making, which is to say, a backstory. The meaning of Europe is 
inextricably connected to the issue of how it has come to be. Historical literature 
and museum displays and exhibitions duly track this back to different origin stories 
(Lähdesmäki, 2018). But the stories are multiple, and the contests over what Europe 
is are incessant. Its shape and cultures have changed dramatically, and will again. In 
this sense, the attempts to define European heritage that we observe in museums, in 
historiography, in policy, in heritage lists and sites, are parts of a somewhat anxious 
project of fixing in place something inherently mutable and transitory.
 Our response to European- level assumptions and desires concerning the col-
lectivising and civilising power of heritage is to complicate them. We show that 
while heritage may indeed have such potentials, it is also a point of contention. 
Therefore, it is an inherently plural and contradictory object, amenable to instru-
mental use by actors interested in promoting xenophobic attitudes to the Euro-
pean past, present and future. While heritage is often seen as a means to address 
social antagonisms and disadvantages, it is also embedded within them and can 
be part of the range of symbolic and affective means and attachments through 
which divisions are created, maintained and exacerbated.
 ‘Europe’ is an unhelpful term in other senses. Although it is not to be con-
flated with the European Union (which grows and can shrink) or the Council of 
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Europe, often the heritage policy that emerges from these entities has application 
wider than their membership. As we saw in the EYCH rhetoric at the beginning 
of this chapter, in some cases the term ‘European space’ is preferred. Is this 
space understood geologically or geographically – dimensions of which few 
people have precise knowledge? Does it refer to the totality of EU member 
states? (In fact, candidate and non- EU countries such as Turkey, Iceland and 
Armenia participated in the EYCH project). Or could ‘European space’ be taken 
to include places where European presence has had a lasting effect, such as 
colonies and settlements? This last interpretation would leave the idea of Euro-
pean space phenomenally open, were it not for a tacit and seemingly general 
desire to contain it and set up boundaries. This is lest ‘Europe’ overspill and 
require recognition the world over This would surely have troubling con-
sequences for celebratory heritage discourse relating to Europeanness and Euro-
pean achievement, once histories of colonialism, appropriation by force and 
suppression of peoples were to be recognised (see Chapter 8, this volume).
Box 1.1
In undertaking research for this book and other publications, we conducted short 
visitor questionnaire surveys at a number of heritage sites and museums in various 
countries within Europe, predominantly within European Union member states. 
The questions we asked changed to respond to the nature of the setting, but we 
always asked questions about identities. In non- hierarchical order, we made a 
series of suggestions of identity categories and asked people to number these in 
order of importance to themselves. Our suggestions included some perennials: 
national, regional, European, as well as non- place-based categories: religion, sexu-
ality, gender, alongside a number of blank spaces for people to fill in as they 
wished. This was intended to avoid closing down possibilities, even though the 
questionnaire delivery was intended to be rapid. Very often, as people went 
through the identity options on offer (or found them inadequate) they said interest-
ing things about their choices and deliberations.
 In one site in the UK, one of the current authors surveyed a British woman in her 
late 50s, on a day out with her family to a heritage event. When she came across the 
check box for ‘European’, she rejected it matter- of-factly: ‘I’m not European’, she 
said, ‘so I can’t put anything there.’ Neither she nor her known ancestors had immi-
grated to the British Isles and she considered herself native to them. The interview 
took place some 18 months after the Brexit referendum of June 2016, and indeed the 
respondent later stated that she had voted for the UK to leave the EU. Yet her refusal 
of European identity was not quite a matter of reactionary politics. As she explained, 
she did not disdain Europe; it was simply because the British Isles were not part of 
Europe, as if they were themselves a continent. 
 At one level – that of official and established knowledge – she was quite wrong: 
the British Isles are, in such a view, an archipelago on the same tectonic plate as 
‘continental Europe’, with a long history of connection and cultural sharing. But at 
another, her response illuminates precisely the contingencies and arbitrations of 
human orderings of the world. 
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Lastly, ‘Europe’ and ‘European’ are floating signifiers that are hitched to very 
different understandings and political desires. We see this in our game of con-
trasts between the expressions of EYCH and Viktor Orbán, but the idea of 
Europe is certainly also sometimes attached to extremely uncivil political ideo-
logies and racisms, not just in Europe itself but also in North America and else-
where. This adds to the difficulty in pinning down ‘Europe’ and fixing its 
contents – physical, intangible, axiological – into place. We can surely find 
Europe outside of geographical Europe, in the church spires of Lucknow 
(Lakhnau) or in the ‘Danish’ village of Solvang in California. A web search 
shows up a further appropriation of ‘European heritage’, for this is, at the time of 
writing, the name of a company that sells luxury kitchen and bathroom tiles. 
Here we see the connotational and consumerist value of the term, as one capable 
of bestowing symbolic capital that sells because of Europe’s distinguished past, 
cultural prestige and canonicity.
 We elect, in this book, not to untangle this knot of meanings to propose a 
certain Europe, but rather to examine it in its multiple discursive iterations, as it 
appears in different settings through different contingencies, techniques and pol-
itics. Europe’s ‘coverage’ remains mutable and its meanings contestable and 
Figure 1.2  At the House of European History in Brussels many of the visitors whom we 
interviewed were struck by this Chinese map of the world, in which Europe is 
decentred and placed on the (left-hand) edge. The map is one of the first 
objects to be encountered, setting up questions about Europe’s place in the 
world and challenging conventional perspectives.
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hard to distinguish, which is, as we will see, both an opportunity and a problem. 
As a malleable matter, Europe can be and is configured instrumentally for polit-
ical interests, in various contradictory ways. As an indistinct, rhetorical form, we 
will see later in this book that it can be unconvincing for some as a vehicle for 
collectivism, leading to popular deficits of identification, solidarity and faith in 
the idea of a supranational polity such as that offered by the EU. Here, ‘reflexive 
Europeanisation’ and thus the creation of a cultural- historical collectivity, or 
what we will call a European heritage demos, fails.
 Nevertheless, we agree with commentators such as Sharon Macdonald (2013) 
and Gerard Delanty (2018) who argue, in different ways, that there is indeed a 
structural specificity within European heritage. This specificity is a result of histor-
ical developments, conditions and effects that have uniquely formed particular 
political orders, ways of life, value systems and memory practices. As Delanty 
argues, however, this is hardly homogenous across Europe, since modernity has 
been configured differently across the continent. We will return to these inspirations 
and the idea of European specificity in Chapter 2. Our general focus in this book, 
however, is on how heritage comes into being – is constructed – through repres-
entation. This is aligned with what Macdonald (2009, p. 118) has earlier termed an 
‘assemblage perspective’ on heritage, directing ‘our attention less to finished “heri-
tage products” than to processes and entanglements involved in their coming into 
being and continuation’. This obviously means that the ‘content’ and meanings of 
heritage vary; its social purchase may be weak and irregular across different con-
texts. Once again, there can be multiple and competing ideas of European heritage, 
as actors call upon different pasts or connote them differently. Dialectically, these 
produce multiple Europes, made by different actors in different places, with 
different kinds of authority, agency and interests. (Since the idea of multiple 
Europes is not new, we shall return to it in Chapter 2.) Apprehending the tense, 
dynamic interaction of these Europes, their encounters, clashes and contrasts, may 
prove to be key to understanding the critical situation of the continent in the present.
An ‘Authorised’ Heritage Discourse and alternate heritages 
of Europe
Some of these ideas of European heritage are official ones. Together they consti-
tute varieties of what Laurajane Smith has usefully termed an ‘Authorised Heri-
tage Discourse’ (AHD), which draws some of its character from a European canon 
of heritage. AHD, in Smith’s words, is ‘based on the Western national and elite 
class experiences, and reinforcing ideas of innate cultural value tied to time depth, 
monumentality, expert knowledge and aesthetics’ (2006, p. 299). It focuses on:
aesthetically pleasing material objects, sites, places and/or landscapes that 
current generations ‘must’ care for, protect and revere so that they may be 
passed on to nebulous future generations for their ‘education’, and to forge 
a sense of common identity based on the past.
 (Ibid.)
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Its authority lies in its own legitimising assumptions that it is universally applic-
able and that it is a commons that unites us. AHD thus relies on certain tech-
niques and cultural practices: lists, canons, bureaucracy, the circulation of 
exclusive power to ‘speak’ among professionalised experts and a cultural elite, 
and the tendency to understand heritage as a ‘boundaried’ entity, as with a ‘site’, 
which is therefore easy to manage both at practical and psychological levels. 
One effect of the dominance of AHD is to impose a kind of lens through which, 
and only through which, people are able to view the past, limiting and reproduc-
ing the heritage canon and the connotations of the very idea of heritage.
 If we accept that such a discourse is in fact in operation, we can also say that 
the EYCH 2018 excerpt cited at the beginning of this chapter actually represents 
an attempt at broadening the (AHD) canon; it actively tries to present other 
‘lenses’ through which to understand heritage, including, as the reader may 
recall, the ‘food we enjoy in company and the films we watch and recognise our-
selves in’. It also seeks to evade a static view of heritage as something the people 
of the present must not change or compromise. And yet European heritage policy 
and discourse continues in many ways to operate as a modified ‘authorised’ dis-
course of this kind, for example in its assumptions regarding commonality and 
collectivity, identity building, transmission to future generations and ‘universal 
value’. For example, in the quote above, the authors still evoke an ill- defined 
collective ‘we’ (consisting of ‘Europeans’, presumably) as its recipients.
 Indeed, it can be argued that one of the strains to which European AHD is 
subject is its peculiar situation in between world orders. The AHD, as Smith 
notes, was forged as a cultural form in the nineteenth century in tandem with the 
development of nation- states. Its violence (or one of its violences) at the level of 
the national was to homogenise place discursively as nation, and thus to fail to 
attend to local distinctiveness or the multiple heritages and pasts that matter to 
people – including women and other non- dominant groups – outwith an elite 
invested in the national project. The nationally- framed AHD, with its emphasis 
on collectivisation and identity- making, was already, in this argument, insuffi-
cient to characterise the plethora of heritages in any given country. National 
AHD nevertheless forms a model for a European, and hence supra- national, 
AHD that is arguably even more ill- fitting, for this is of course an even larger 
territory to seek to make into a common ground; one in which ways of life, iden-
tities and historical experiences proliferate exponentially in comparison with 
those within a nation- state.
 Another frame for collectivity is the United Nations concept of ‘humanity’ 
(originally ‘mankind’) and the connected notion of ‘universal value’ (sometimes 
‘outstanding universal value’, a criterion for ‘World Heritage’ status). Since at 
least the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention this concept has powered 
an ethics of global collectivisation that theoretically transcends national identi-
ties, though paradoxically it tends to reinforce them because nations are key 
administrative units within the proposal of what counts as ‘world heritage’. 
European heritage sits uncomfortably in between these two national and uni-
versal frames. Neither national heritage writ large, abstracted to the scale of a 
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continent, nor universal heritage writ small (for this would be oxymoronic), 
European AHD borrows tropes and techniques from each of these powerful 
scales. This adds considerably to the difficulties of defining European heritage, 
which begins to look less like a stock of actual stuff, and more like a political 
expression, a set of borrowings and contingencies, a leaky bureaucratic category 
through which to organise practice, but perhaps not to think on too closely, in 
case it should fail to hold.
 Although we recognise AHD, as coined by Smith, as a useful analytical tool, 
in this book we adopt a broader understanding of heritage as a representational, 
discursive and performative practice involving conscious attempts to symboli-
cally valorise aspects of the past in the present. Very often, such practice is con-
ducted with a view to future- making. It can encompass ‘discourse’ in the sense 
used by Smith (‘There is, really, no such thing as heritage’ (2006, p. 11)) as well 
as the ‘use of the past as a cultural, political, and economic resource for the 
present’ (Ashworth, Graham and Tunbridge, 2007, pp. 2–3). It includes memory 
practice, where particular pasts are transformed into objects of ritual and perfor-
mative remembrance and where historical symbols are called upon to express 
guiding values in the present. Representation is the common denominator, and 
here we can combine the different semantic possibilities of the term: represent-
ing, re- presenting, re- presenting.
 We do not deny the reality of heritage insofar as it can be theorised non- 
semantically and non- representationally: as pre- cognitive experience, as 
embodied presences, as inchoate affect and unconscious ‘doing’. But such under-
standings are not our focus, and nor are they incompatible with an interest in the 
representational dimensions of heritage practice as a conscious mode of valoris-
ing the past in the present, and in expressing desires about the future. This can 
happen through, for example, the upholding, reviving or inventing of traditions; 
performative re- enactments and ‘living history’ practices; reconstructions (e.g. 
of buildings); policy papers and charters; conservation decisions and actions; 
commemorative practices; presentations of historical tangible and intangible 
culture; or imbuing and mobilising particular historical stories and phenomena 
with key significance for contemporary identities, for example in political 
speeches like Orbán’s. In some cases, this involves a certain collapse – deliber-
ate or unreflexive – of otherwise separate temporalities. Within the purview of 
this book, heritage can be official or unofficial, tangible or intangible, or mix-
tures of these. In some ways, we align our expansive approach with one of the 
key convictions of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on the Value 
of Cultural Heritage for Society (Council of Europe, 2005a), known as the Faro 
Convention, which promotes the view that ‘objects and places are not, in them-
selves, what is important about cultural heritage. They are important because of 
the meanings and uses that people attach to them and the values they 
represent.’12
 Indeed, there is hardly any particular entity that cannot qualify as heritage – at 
least for someone, as long as it is perceived as being of the past and of having 
symbolic value in the present. There is also no theoretical limit, or regulation on, 
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the meanings and uses ascribed to that past, nor on the nature of the values that 
people derive from them. Of course, we often find official attempts to police 
heritage, whether through legislation, policy or censorship, but this is not suffi-
cient to pose theoretical limits on our definition. Particular attachments to ‘heri-
tage’ as a symbolic valorisation of the past in the present need not be shared by 
large numbers of people and need not be ascribed ‘progressive’ or ‘civil’ mean-
ings for them to have phenomenal social effect. 
BOX 1.2
In 2011 the then- unknown Norwegian Anders Behring Breivik murdered 69 people 
on the island of Utøya, mostly youth members of the Norwegian Socialist Workers 
Youth League (Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking, or AUF ). He drew inspiration from a 
melange of historical symbols: the crusades, the Siege of Vienna of 1683 and 
Norse mythology (he inscribed the name of Odin’s spear, Gungnir, in rune script 
onto his rifle). Through articulating and valorising such symbols, he also articu-
lated a politico- historical vision of a European civilisation imperilled by otherness 
and multiculturalism. This extended into a project of murdering those – particu-
larly the younger generation of AUF members – who welcome and celebrate 
difference within society. At this point, Breivik arguably became a kind of 
powerful heritage actor, irrespective of whatever distorted, selective, inaccurate 
version of the past he had fabricated in his imagination, or how morally unac-
ceptable we might find his actions. This is, of course, an extreme case, but it shows 
that the serious effects of heritage are not entirely or solely in the control of elite 
jurisdiction, powerful ‘authorised’ discourses notwithstanding.
This concerns the tendency for actors to make alternate ‘worlds’ through 
recourse to the past. Personally- held attachments to heritage can be part of 
complex imaginaries in the sense articulated by Charles Taylor. That is, the way 
people ‘imagine’ their social existence, not in theoretical terms, but with 
‘images, stories, and legends’: ‘how [people] fit together with others, how things 
go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, 
and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations’ 
(Taylor, 2007, p. 23). Such imaginaries rely on and constitute a sense of self- in-
history, sometimes making for identity positions that are at odds with others, 
occasionally manifesting in large- scale social and political division with momen-
tous consequences. Such imaginaries do not replace AHD, but frequently clash 
with it.
 Similarly, we diverge from a ‘pure’ AHD expression of who the actors and 
what the objects of heritage are. In instruments such as the Faro Convention, or 
UNESCO’s more recent iterations of the World Heritage Convention’s Opera-
tional Guidelines,13 there is an ethical drive to incorporate ‘community’ perspec-
tives on heritage, leading to technical developments such as co- production 
models that enable this. This is an important and welcome shift (although not 
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without its problems and paradoxes), but we are more concerned here to reflect 
upon the everyday circulation and importance of heritage in people’s lives at the 
level of banal and mundane concerns as well as political convictions. People are, 
in some ways, heritage actors irrespective of official attempts to enable this, and 
while they do not tend to benefit from ‘authorised’ status nor count as the expert 
figures responsible for producing and upholding the AHD, they may certainly 
wield power within the physical, digital, social and public spaces of their own 
lives. Heritage is not contained by a list or set of sites, objects and practices. 
Rather, it circulates continuously – and often somewhat uncontrollably – through 
private and public space, experience, imagination and discourse, at different 
scales, and in dynamic relations with contemporary social, economic, cultural 
and geopolitics.
Dimensions of heritage
Once we examine how heritage is constructed, we may look in turn at what 
‘heritage’, as discourse and practice, itself produces, or is used to produce. This 
is to talk of its discursive effects that may be imbricated within profoundly signi-
ficant socio- political change, or within the lifeworlds of individuals as a refer-
ence for making sense of the present and, reflexively, of themselves. Heritage 
‘happens’ in different ways and spaces, through different forms of iteration. 
Each of these is capable of producing particular effects. In this book, we term 
these modalities and spaces of heritage dimensions, as we will explain in depth 
below. Our contention is that through such different dimensions in which heri-
tage figures, certain realities are made, or made possible. More specifically, in 
our chosen settings, certain ‘Europes’ are produced that are necessarily discur-
sive constructs, but that very often – indeed usually – have structuring effects. 
For example, we will see shortly that the ‘dimension’ of heritage policy- making 
constructs a particular idea of Europe, comprising its history, peoples, political 
orientations and social and moral values. It does so through particular rhetorics 
and techniques that actively structure ‘outcomes’, most obviously through 
authoritative and top- down forms of funding (see Chapter 3, this volume). As we 
saw in the EYCH discussion earlier, the Europe that is evoked through this 
dimension of policy is never merely conceptual or discursive, and never just an 
idea, for it precipitates action that may strongly configure social, political and 
physical space.
 ‘Dimension’ is a term often cursorily used in the academic vernacular, but we 
aim to use it as a figure with precise, if multiple, meanings. In its Latin etymo-
logy, ‘dimension’ concerns measuring, dimetri – to measure out – which for us 
holds a range of helpful connotations, linking to the way actors try to map and 
chart Europe and its history, or to how the EU seeks to measure European heri-
tage through its lists, prizes, definitions and data gathering. In a governmental 
sense, measurement is about controlling expressions and meanings, and being 
able to demonstrate and quantify effects. More recently, it has taken on other 
meanings whereby one’s citizenship, or right to citizenship, can be measured, as 
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in points- based assessments for prospective immigrants. It is also about identifying 
the scale and coverage of things – ‘Europe’ in this case – and, therefore, establish-
ing boundaries and borders of containment and limitation. These boundaries and 
borders may be literal, with obvious real- world effects concerning the control of 
peoples and bodies – as in the case of the Serbian- Hungarian border fence (see 
Chapter 9, this volume) – and/or they may be abstractions, like when actors talk 
about what counts or does not count as European heritage, or as a European value. 
Here, indeed, acts of mental measuring, parsing and bordering are undertaken, 
whose effects at different scales, from the geopolitical to the individual lifeworld, 
may be no less profound for inclusion and exclusion than a securitised metal fence. 
Scalings of Europe are part of the ‘work’ of dimensions, and dimensions are also 
capable of transecting different scales. Consider, for example, one of the dimen-
sions of heritage that we examine in this book, which we call ‘reversions’. This is 
about nostalgic and commemorative returns to a particular past, whether through 
re- enactment, reconstruction and rebuilding processes or revivals. A case in point 
is the popular annual D- Day Festival in Normandy, where amateur enthusiasts 
show off their lovingly maintained military vehicles to crowds eager to celebrate 
the uncomplicated moral heroism of the Allied liberators of Nazi- occupied France 
and Europe in 1944. The enthusiasts and crowds alike are part of a multi- scalar 
assemblage in which powerful politicians are also present as memory actors. Inter-
national relations occur, and the world order is formed at the high scale, for the 
negotiation of contemporary geopolitical relations is made in reference to a sym-
bolic past. The dimension of reversion ‘scales’ a particular Europe in relation to 
the past, but it also crosses through multiple scales, in each of which the past is 
called upon (recalled) to make futures.
 In a second understanding of ‘dimensions’ we turn to its sci- fi connotations. 
Many of us have grown up with books and films offering the tantalising possib-
ility of alternate realities. This is the idea that in some other dimension things 
could be subtly or radically different. To entertain this is to make a cut into the 
ordinary surfaces of human experience, through which one might glimpse worlds 
that are both alien yet uncannily familiar. Through this insight, we might be 
motivated to look again at ourselves and our situations and perceptions. This is 
what gives the idea of ‘dimensions’ power as a device of fiction. It alters our 
perception by showing us other worlds and ways of thinking, being and perceiv-
ing. Alternative imaginaries are made possible that in turn may lead us to rethink 
ourselves and our positions in time, place and society.
 For the purposes of writing this book, this sci- fi inspiration allowed us to 
think not of one Europe but of several possible or competing Europes. We do 
not have to turn to make- believe, or to theoretical physics and cosmology, to 
propose this. The Europe produced by European Council (EC) directives and 
heritage policies may be quite different from that produced by the German far- 
right collective PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the 
Occident). It may have different coverage, emphases, politics, values and affects; 
and even that is to assume, simplistically, that only one Europe is produced 
respectively by the EC or PEGIDA. In the case of the EC, this is a dimension of 
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supranational, authoritative, instrumental and electorally- mandated policy- 
making, capable of distributing significant financial and symbolic capital. In the 
case of PEGIDA, we may understand its operations as occurring within a dimen-
sion of perceived loss, expressed in mass gatherings and other performances and 
representations of protest. These and many other Europes may spread and circu-
late differently and follow their own trajectories. They may also, of course, occa-
sionally come into contact, informing, ignoring or reacting against one another 
in a multi- dimensional interplay that possesses no particular overall harmony 
and certainly no overall co- ordination or plan. Addressing European heritage 
through such a lens allows us to consider how heritage is produced through mul-
tiple actors, techniques and agendas, from local hobby groups of historical re- 
enactors to officially listed world heritage sites, or how there come to be 
distinctive understandings of what European identity and heritage is – whether 
secular, Christian or multi- faith, aristocratic or industrial, northern or southern, 
national or transnational, and so on – bearing in mind that these too are often in 
themselves heterogeneous and contested concepts.
 The dimensions of European heritage upon which we focus in this book are 
only homogenous insofar as they are technical and affective spaces. These are 
Figure 1.3  At the Victoria and Albert Museum’s Europe 1600–1815 galleries, this space 
sits within the Enlightenment; it is intended as a discussion space, a museal 
translation of a salon where dialogues about the meanings of ‘European’ art 
are held.
18  Christopher Whitehead et al.
metaphorical (but sometimes also geographically situated) spaces in which 
certain techniques are available and certain emotional appeals are made possible. 
Through such techniques and appeals, collectivities are discursively constructed 
that refer to geohistorical imaginaries and construct a self- in-history. Through 
collectivisation, senses of belonging resonate within relational constructions of 
place, time and people. The dimensions we choose to focus on are: policy, 
insofar as it defines, creates and instumentalises a ‘European heritage’; the 
nation, as a frame of belonging through which actors articulate resistance, and/or 
relations, to a wider frame of ‘Europe’, and through which other pasts are 
evaded, such as colonial ones; reversions and reprisals, which call upon mobili-
sations of particular pasts for world- making in the present; difficult history as a 
formative narrative for European identities; loss as an affective dimension that 
enables or compels actors to fashion particular subject positions and requires 
particular kinds of memory work; and edges as a situated positioning, where we 
ask what kind of ‘Europe’ is visible from the peripheries, whether these are 
taken to refer to geographical, compass- point extremes or locales at the brink of 
social and economic rifts.
 In each of these dimensions, opportunities vary for forms of representation, 
for performance, for making use of media and for audience and seeking pur-
chase, as do the levels of agency of actors. The Europe created in a dinner- table 
discussion cannot ‘behave’ in the same way as one made through a right- wing 
interest website, or one produced in a piece of EC policy. And yet it is their co- 
existence and often tense interaction that makes Europe and European heritage 
both multiple and fluid. Acknowledging this fluidity, we contend that notwith-
standing their differences, these dimensions of European heritage are compar-
ably affected by certain forces of motion, or dynamics, while also contributing to 
their further development, travel and effects. For example, and as already dis-
cussed, a crisis dynamics (or a sense of it) will be felt in different ways across 
different dimensions, triggering different effects and affects. It will be felt, and it 
may change things, in the boardroom and at the dinner table, in the street protest 
and in top- down heritage funding streams. Similarly, dynamics are variously 
created through the encounters between peoples, groups belief systems, mater-
ials and technologies, that have different effects and affects in the dimensions 
we study, sometimes leading to social contests about what is true and right. For 
example, the crossing of refugees into Europe is presently a key dynamic that 
has led to different iterations of Europe and European heritage, including both 
cosmopolitan and xenophobic, and inclusive and exclusive, views of what 
Europe is, and how that relates to its past and future.
 In short, dimensions are spaces wherein certain techniques, whether bureau-
cratic, rhetorical or governmental, and affects make scripts for collectivisation, 
for a ‘self- in-history’ and for a future world that is in some way better than the 
present – whether we are talking about the policy aim of fostering greater inter-
cultural understanding and civility or someone’s nostalgic desire to return to the 
old ways and the old days, ‘before things went wrong’. Dimensions are a 
binding- together of technical, affective and political matter to produce worlds. 
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They come more strongly ‘into play’ according to political and emotional con-
tingencies and, though they can be invoked tactically for political effect, they 
can ‘go on’ in their effects, with some autonomy, not least because they intersect 
and their effects multiply and promulgate (cf. Macdonald 2013: p. 4). There are 
of course other possible dimensions that we have not explored, in some cases 
because they have had relatively full treatment elsewhere, such as what we might 
call the affective dimension of ‘regret’ (Olick 2007). The attentive reader may 
also notice overlap between these dimensions, and this is a product neither of 
intellectual laxity nor coincidence; rather, it is an imprint of the relational and 
dynamic behaviour, interaction and intertextuality of dimensions in which 
worlds – and selves – are made from the past.
The structure of this book
This chapter has outlined the origin of this book, as a product of EU- funded 
research into the potentials to identify and constructively mobilise ‘the’ Euro-
pean heritage for social, political and collective benefit, involving the making of 
a ‘European heritage demos’. We have explained how we have spoken back to 
this agenda, tilting the frame, as it were, to propose an alternative, realist per-
spective that there is hardly one monolithic European heritage, and therefore, 
discursively and effectively, no single Europe. This multiplication of meanings 
is produced through an array of dimensions that are much more numerous and 
pervasive than conventional bracketings of where heritage ‘sits’ within public, 
cultural and social life. This makes ‘European heritage’ difficult to contain, to 
regulate and to measure out in the ideal form desired by policy- makers; it may 
even mean that the heritage demos is a dream that cannot be realised. In our con-
clusion to this book we return to these problems with some constructive 
suggestions.
 Chapter 2, Remapping European heritage and memory, provides a mapping 
of the overlapping fields with which this book is concerned, in order to set out 
some working positions on heritage and its uses that enable constructive connec-
tions with the fields and theories that relate to it, while also articulating relations 
to practice and to instrumental agendas. Can memory have a collective dimen-
sion, and how is this manifest in constructions of European memory? What then 
are its articulations with history, heritage and identity? This chapter presents 
some of the prickly definitional questions encountered throughout the volume 
(‘heritage’, ‘memory’, ‘history’, ‘Europe’ etc.) and axiological issues concerning 
the social and civil purpose of the research. It offers an integrated account of 
heritage and memory cultures in Europe that engages not just with scholarship, 
but also takes policy, regulation and practice seriously, as means through which 
heritage, memory and identity are theorised.
 These problems point to methodological concerns: how do we make sense of a 
dynamic, fluid, opaque entity such as Europe, particularly in relation to equally 
complex and vague notions such as heritage and memory? The idea of covering all 
geographical territory evenly would lead to superficial and historically unspecific 
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understandings, and – of course – Europe has changed and is changing, as borders, 
countries and meanings are defined, redefined and often contested. Europe is also 
not understandable in isolation – as Gerard Delanty argues, in an important regard 
Europe is fundamentally ‘non- European’, because its historical development is so 
obviously not limited to endogenous factors. As discussed, ideas of heritage and 
memory are also mutable and matters of dissent, not just in ‘authorised’ contexts 
and definitions produced by official institutions (e.g. UNESCO, the EC, national 
governments, etc.) but also by different social groups and in scholarship. So then 
we are faced with a set of particular problems that are not just methodological but 
also conceptual and political: if we are to get at ‘European heritages’, when both 
the individual components of this term and their combined meanings are so dis-
puted, then what is it that we should study, and how? Any articulation of method 
in such a context has profoundly political liabilities and we discuss our approaches 
and positions – including ethical ones – to this issue.
 The following chapters work through a number of key areas, in which we 
observe the operation and interplay of certain dimensions of the production of 
heritage and memory. In Chapter 3, The instruments of European heritage, Zito 
et al. argue that if we are to consider the dimensions of European heritage and 
memory it is imperative to examine the official – the dimension of the legal and 
political instruments and policies that seek to preserve, record, interpret, transmit 
and also to create an official European heritage and a European backstory. The 
chapter focuses in particular on two formal European political arenas that are 
creating European heritage and narratives, namely the Council of Europe (COE) 
and the EU. The chapter shows the plethora of political instruments and policies 
that both political organisations have produced that relate to or have a bearing on 
heritage practice, sometimes incidentally and sometimes more purposively and 
explicitly. The landscape of these instruments is confusing to navigate. Further-
more, there are often deep underlying tensions that lurk beneath these efforts, 
including for example the focus on embracing unity through diversity. How then 
do policy- making institutions seek to intervene and make people engage with 
memories, histories and identities by creating cultural heritage institutions and 
instruments? After a discussion of the different ways in which heritage instru-
ments promote European integration in the Council of Europe and the European 
Union, the chapter narrows the focus onto two examples: the European Heritage 
Label (EU) and the European Landscape Convention (COE), opening perspec-
tives onto the policy construction of Europe and its heritage.
 In Chapter 4, Reversion and reprisal, Daugbjerg et al. explore practices that 
seek to remake the past in the present, whether in architectural and landscape 
form, as in open- air museums, or rebuilding projects, and in re- enactments and 
immersive environments such as panoramas. These sometimes relate to top- 
down appeals to citizens to cultivate attachments to particular pasts and to model 
a sense of self- in-history that is auxiliary to political identities. In less overtly 
governmental settings, people who feel embattled or alienated by social change 
may use heritage to exercise a desire to revert to imagined cultural worlds. 
‘Reversions’ is a way of thinking about the process of looking to the past to find 
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alternative futures that put back in place what has been lost, while its secondary 
meaning – making successive versions – speaks to creative and plural imagin-
ings of the past.
 In Chapter 5, Edges and centres, Whitehead et al. explore the margins. They 
argue that from the edges we see things differently and a boundary (perceived or 
otherwise) is a particular vantage point in which subjects are positioned, or posi-
tion themselves. ‘Edge’ places often have particular geohistories that are made 
as a result of their peculiar location and the spatial politics they are embroiled in, 
often because of their strategic value for conferring control of space and sym-
bolic dominance (e.g. the Dardanelles). Edge places attract certain kinds of event 
because of their geopolitical position. This then leads to ‘edgy heritage’ in which 
crossings, crises and contests are deeply and peculiarly felt. They are conceptual 
as well as literal borderlands, for they are spaces of oscillation, contamination 
and negotiation between cultures and heritages. Edges may be seen as the meas-
ured and charted limits of identity or the extreme points at which the extent of 
something (Europe) terminates, as spaces of containment, ingress to and exit 
from the scene. They may seem to be marginal spaces that matter less, but they 
can take on high salience: as places that mark a tactical non- plus-ultra, as places 
that may be lost, forcing a rebalancing of Europe (e.g. the uncertain fate of the 
island of Ireland as one of the western edges of Europe); as contested places, 
bridges to, transitional spaces or forcefields between, other worlds (Turkey, 
Andalusia, Scandinavia, Ireland). But the ‘edges’ of Europe are not just geo-
graphical – they can also be socio- economic, political, moral or ethnic: com-
passes of different sorts. The chapter argues that edge places of different kinds 
offer a peculiar spatial and affective dimension in which both to view, make and 
unmake different Europes, where symbolic imaginaries and geopolitics come 
into relation.
 In Chapter 6, Situating belonging at the intersection of multi- scalar, multi- 
dimensional and multidirectional heritage, Markham et al. focus on a site that is 
both centre and edge. The historic port city of Gdańsk in Poland is – in some 
narratives – tightly central to a European story of trade, industry and emancipa-
tion from oppression by way of the Solidarity Movement. The city itself is a 
recipient of conspicuous EU funding through which – together with private 
investment – considerable heritage and gentrification projects are afoot. Against 
this frame, the authors explore the conundrum of people’s apparent lack of sense 
of allegiance to European- level bodies such as the EU, even as they live in 
places structurally shaped by that same body, and even as they may still identify 
as having a stake in a more general concept of European history. They draw on 
Eriksen’s concept of a ‘clash of scales’ to explain the mismatches and tensions 
between different mobilisations of the past, in which contrasting affective reper-
toires and subject positions are evident as part of the tense making of place.
 In Chapter 7, on the paradoxes of time, place and memory, Eckersley and 
Bozoğlu analyse ‘difficult’ heritage in connection with the paradox of demo-
cracy and Arendt’s ‘promise’. ‘Difficult history’, the chapter argues, exists in a 
shifting spatio- temporal dimension, beset by paradoxes which circulate and 
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recirculate challenges from the past, present and future. As the touchstone of the 
EU’s story, Eckersley and Bozoğlu analyse: how the Holocaust is put to service 
as a paradoxically universal and singular ‘negative founding myth’ which has 
persisted over time; the ways in which simultaneously shared yet divided Euro-
pean memories pertain to contemporary political tensions; and the impact of 
absent memories and contested belonging within the European heritage record. 
The authors examine these in multiple museum and memorial heritage site rep-
resentations, including the House of the Wannsee Conference, Auschwitz 
Memorial and Museum, Schloss Cecilienhof – the site of the Potsdam Confer-
ence, the Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk, and the Lepsiushaus in 
Potsdam. A spatial and digital ‘site’: the Houshamadyan web Archive, which 
constitutes a vast, digital recuperation or rescue of lost Ottoman- Armenian 
memory, provides an ‘unofficial’ memory book for Europe, in contrast to the 
‘official’ heritage sites. Bound up and entangled with Arendt’s ‘promise’ and the 
paradox of democracy – past, present and future time is found here to be in flux, 
through the ‘continual unsettlement’ (Macdonald 2009) of European memory by 
different actors within the politics and practice of heritage.
 In Chapter 8, On the politics of selective memory in Europe, Gurminder K. 
Bhambra questions one of the principal ‘founding myths’ of the European 
Union, which is that it is an assembly of nations seeking to avoid the recurrence 
of war through a brand of cosmopolitanism that balances national difference 
with European commonality. This, in her argument, is a selective remembering, 
or a kind of tacit, discursive trick, to evade engagement with the different back-
story of European colonial endeavour. This means that the ‘diversity’ of EU 
member states is misrecognised, the historical nature of those states as colonisers 
goes unacknowledged, and their multicultural societies are seen as an imposition 
of the recent past and present (a cause of crisis), rather than as foundational and 
fundamental constituents of Europe.
 In our thinking, the ‘nation’ as frame constitutes a dimension – a technical 
and affective space – through which a ‘Europe’ is constituted as an imaginary in 
which member states have ‘purified their histories as national histories and ima-
gined their political communities as composed of “kith and kin” ’. This is to say 
that the member state as nation is a dimension of othering, disentitlement and 
disinheritance, in the sense articulated by Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996, p. 21), 
wherein a ‘European’ heritage is possessed by ‘Europeans’ and is therefore logi-
cally not the proper possession of ‘others’. To be sure, there is an extensive 
debate in museology and museum practice about the role of former colonial 
ethnographic museums, maritime and city museums in recognising colonial pasts 
and admitting historical culpability, more or less according to a ‘difficult history’ 
paradigm. One can, however, doubt the extent to which heritage initiatives actu-
ally stitch colonialism into a story of state formation, and into a politics of the 
European present. Such disjunction allows powerful actors to claim that multi-
culturalism has ‘failed’ as if it were some kind of graft that has failed to take 
onto the pre- formed body of the state. If, as this chapter argues, there is a kind of 
wilful misremembering of European history, what other ‘Europe’ would emerge 
Dimensions of European heritage and memory  23
from an alternative view? What ‘European heritage’ could be identified and to 
whom could that belong?
 In Chapter 9 the editors are joined by filmmaker Ian McDonald, in a reflec-
tion on the specially- commissioned film Who is Europe? The film is a creative 
analogue to this book, although we hope it has productively contaminated our 
writing and editing too. It was made at the same time, for the same project and in 
response to common theoretical and political underpinnings. The film documents 
different sites and subject positions from those exemplified in this book, but with 
a comparable attention to the unexpected and unintended dimensions and heri-
tage through which Europe is made. Like many of the contributions to this book, 
it works through locations, observations, dissonances and contrasts. The 
dominant structural formal devices of the consecutive ‘acts’ and the split- screen 
format present the plurality, dialectics and friction between worlds, between 
imaginaries and subject positions. We introduced the figure of the split- screen 
earlier, in relation to Orbán’s politics of exclusion and the European Year of 
Cultural Heritage’s celebratory, collectivising discourse. It is fitting that the film 
returns to these very grounds (among others), exploring both the new Hungarian 
border fence and a Europe- wide orchestration of bell- ringing to celebrate peace. 
Above all, the film asks the critical question expressed in its title – a question 
that recurs throughout all of the contributions to this book – who is Europe? 
From here, other interrogatives automatically converge: what, where, when, 
how, why, whose?
 In Chapter 10, the editors bring together the different strands of the book to 
propose some final thoughts concerning the role of heritage and memory in the 
production of different collectivities and forms of belonging that co- exist and 
clash. This is to say that the European ‘heritage demos’ can only ever fail as a 
project of total collectivisation, and indeed has the inherent liability to function 
as an object against which alternative collectivities are organised reactively and 
antagonistically.
 Other forms of collectivisation, such as the promotion of national identities or 
value- driven moral and cosmopolitan communities (Guibernau, 2007; Lister and 
Pia, 2008) have also been implicated in considerable social and political divi-
sions, including the rise of xenophobic and atavistic nationalism and the vilifica-
tion of ‘citizens of nowhere’ (as Theresa May famously termed those who would 
claim a post- national identity as ‘citizens of the world’ in 2016). What, if any-
thing, can heritage offer as a frame or container for collectivisation? Chapters in 
this book show that collectivisation in reference to the symbolic valorisation of 
the past is hardly a good in itself: memory communities often collectivise around 
atavistic and exclusionary heritages in order to negotiate a shared self- in-history 
that may be an anxious or aggressive response to change, alienation and loss of 
control. Here we return to the constant tensions between homogeneity and heter-
ogeneity that beset rhetorical and policy constructions of unity in diversity. We 
explore this in some depth through the use of interviews and focus groups con-
ducted at heritage sites of different sorts which problematise what we call the 
European heritage ‘record’ (as a kind of political analogue to the fossil record) 
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and its relations to belonging or non- belonging. What should heritage actors do 
in pursuit of community and civility? We argue that the potential exists for heri-
tage initiatives and museums to work creatively to bring historical narratives to 
bear on today’s concerns and ask questions about relationships between past and 
present, in order to encourage reflexive and critical understandings of our self – 
or selves – in history.
Notes
 1 Grant number 693289; https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/199996/factsheet/en
 2 https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP- 8060%23 
fullreport
 3 https://cordis.europa.eu/programme/rcn/664966/en
 4 www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/31/refugees- problem-europe- identity-
crisis- migration
 5 European Museums in an Age of Migrations (MeLa), 2011–15, EU FP Grant Agree-
ment 266757. https://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/99606/factsheet/en.
 6 E.g. www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/jacob- furedi/eu- referendum-brexit_b_10543692.html; 
also in relation to ECHR: www.ukipdaily.com/magna- carta-europe- now/
 7 https://europa.eu/cultural- heritage/about_en
 8 www.kormany.hu/en/the- prime-minister/the- prime-minister- s-speeches/prime- minister- 
viktor- orban-s- address-in- parliament-before- the-start- of-daily- business20160912
 9 ‘European- level’ is intended here to comprise policy initiatives of multiple kinds and 
from different bodies, including the European Commission, European Parliament, 
Council of Europe as well as sectoral actors such as Europa Nostra, Culture Action 
Europe etc., that address and seek to frame notions of the value of heritage in and for 
‘Europe’ as a trans- and/or supranational entity. For a survey and classification of 
policy see Chapter 3, this volume. Recent initiatives that rely on the notion and valori-
sation of a shared European heritage include, among others: Conclusions on Cultural 
Heritage as a Strategic Resource for a Sustainable Europe (Council of the European 
Union, 2014); Communication Towards an Integrated Approach to Cultural Heritage 
for Europe (European Commission, 2014); Getting Cultural Heritage to Work for 
Europe (European Commission, 2015); Cultural Heritage Counts for Europe (ChCfe, 
2015); Political Statement on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the Rome 
Treaties: Culture at the Heart of a Sustainable Europe (European Alliance for Culture 
and the Arts, 2017); Strategy 21: European Heritage Strategy for the 21st Century 
(Council of Europe, 2017); A New European Agenda for Culture (European Commis-
sion, 2018); The Berlin Call to Action: Cultural Heritage for the Future of Europe 
(Europa Nostra, 2018).
10 See for example www.miniszterelnok.hu/orban- viktor-beszede- a-felujitott- hagyomanyok-
haza- atadojan/
11 www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/educ/142705.pdf
12 www.coe.int/en/web/culture- and-heritage/faro- convention
13 https://whc.unesco.org/en/guidelines/
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